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The objective of this paper is analyse the determinants of the Argentine cri-
sis of 2001-2002. In particular we analyse the role of macroeconomic policies
during the crisis. The crisis coincided with a sudden stop of capital ￿ows. We
use a VAR model to better understand the shocks and mechanisms by which
the crisis propagated throughout the economy. We ￿nd evidence that Argentine
crisis was the consequence of an external ￿nancial shock, expressed by the in-
crease in sovereign spread, ampli￿ed by local vulnerabilities. Fiscal policy, that
faced ￿nancial restrictions, was tightened and the economy su￿ered additional
contractionary ￿scal shocks. The recession was exacerbated by a real exchange
rate shock, that was appreciated. This result is the consequence of the rigid ￿xed
exchange rate used by Argentina and the lack of coordination inside the Mercosur
agreement where Brazil devaluate while Argentina not. Our analysis suggests the
convenience of generate an institutional framework that allows a ￿exible use of
￿scal and exchange rate policies to confront with adverse external shocks.
Keywords: crisis, Argentina, country risk, ￿xed exchange rates, procyclical
￿scal policy.
JEL classi￿cation: E32, F33, F34, F41
1 Introduction
The Argentine crisis is a paradigmatic case of an emerging country crisis originated in
a sudden stop of capital ￿ows. The understanding of the e￿ects of ￿scal and exchange
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1rate policies during the crisis can be a reference for other emerging countries that have
to deal with similar adverse shocks.
After the capital ￿ows reversal, that followed the Russian default of August 1998,
Argentina decided to follow a contractionary ￿scal policy and mantained its rigid
￿xed exchange rate regime (the "Convertibility"). The important ￿nancial restriction
su￿ered by the public sector and the idea that a tight ￿scal policy could restore
con￿dence and foster economic activity, motivated the adoption of this type of ￿scal
behaviour. The adverse balance sheet e￿ects associated to a devaluation in a dollarized
economy, promoted the maintainance of the Convertibility. Argentina su￿ered a long
lasting recession that ￿nally conducted to a deep crisis in 2001-2002, when Argentina
abandoned the peg and defaulted in its public debt.
The central goal of this paper is to study the role played by macroeconomic policies
during the Argentine crisis and its implications for the optimal macroeconomic policy
of an emerging country that faces an external ￿nancial shock. Speci￿cally, we focus
on the following questions. 1) What was the role played by the ￿scal policy during
the Argentine crisis? Is there any evidence about an expansive e￿ect on GDP of a
contractionary ￿scal policy via a credibility improvement? 2) What is the role of the
real exchange rate in the adjustment process of a dollarized economy that has to deal
with a sudden stop? 3) What was the role of the Convertibility in the Argentine crisis?
Or more in general, does the exchange rate regime matter for the adjustment process
of a dollarized economy after a sudden stop?
During and after the Argentine crisis there has been an important debate, both
at academic and policy level, about the role played by macroeconomic policies during
the crisis. However, there has been little formal empirical analysis about the issue,
which is the aim of this work.
In this paper we try to contribute with new evidence to this debate. We perform
VAR analysis to see the dynamic interactions between ￿nancial shocks and macroe-
conomic policies in the Argentine case. We analyse the di￿erent shocks su￿ered by
Argentina and their role in the development of the crisis. In the case of some rele-
vant shocks (the Brazilian devaluation and the Convertibility collapse and default of
beginning of 2002) we use the dummy variable approach. By this way we are able to
see the speci￿c e￿ects of these special events.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿y presents some facts about the
Argentine crisis. Section 3 reviews some related literature. Section 4 discusses several
methodological issues, including the choice of variables and the identi￿cation of shocks.
Section 5 presents the main results of the paper. Section 6 analyses how sensitive are
the results to changes in some methodological options. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Argentine crisis
Argentina enjoyed during 1990’s a signi￿cant growth process with a decreasing in-
￿ation. Public debt to GDP ratio decreased during the ￿rst half of the decade and
remained at low levels during the second half. Argentina participated with Uruguay
and Brazil in the Mercosur integration process1 and had in operation stabilisation
plans based on an exchange rate peg. The ￿nancial system of Argentina and Uruguay
1The Mercosur was established on 26 March 1991 with the signature of the Asunci￿n Treaty by
the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
2was in a great extent dollarized, and also the majority of the public debt was issued
in foreign currency.
The ￿nancial problems of East Asia and Russia led to a reversal of capital ￿ows
to emerging countries and to Mercosur countries in particular (specially after the
devaluation and default of Russia on August 1998). At the beginning of 1999, Brazil
abandoned its exchange rate peg while Argentina and Uruguay opted for maintaining
their stabilisation plans. A long lasting recession started in Argentina and Uruguay,
that ￿nally led to an important economic crisis and to problems with the management
of public debt.
In a companion paper, Mourelle (2009), we provide a more detailed analysis about
the crisis of 2001-2002 in Argentina and Uruguay. In that paper we characterize the
crisis as the result of an adverse external shock in a vulnerable environment. The
vulnerable environment was given by a perverse combination of unsustainable ￿scal
policies, ￿xed exchange rate and a great de facto dollarization.
The two processes also exhibited some di￿erences. Uruguay had a more ￿exible
exchange rate peg that allowed a more gradual adjustment of the real exchange rate. 2
Rating agencies gave investment grade status to the Uruguayan public debt. The
public debt of Uruguay was issued at low interest rates, which facilitated its restruc-
turing after the devaluation. On the contrary the Argentine exchange rate peg (the
"Convertibility") was very rigid.3 The Argentine public debt was issued at high in-
terest rates during the recession which implied a strong restriction for ￿scal policy.
Argentina ￿nally defaulted on its public debt and the following tortuous restructuring
process implied unprecedent investor losses ("haircuts", in ￿nancial jargon).
In Table 1 we can see the growth rate of di￿erent Argentine variables during the pe-
riod 1995-2007. During the second half of 1998 recession started in Argentina (seasonal
adjusted GDP decreased 0.6% with respect to the ￿rst half of 1998). The beginning of
the recession was related to a reversal in capital ￿ows to Mercosur countries, associ-
ated to the Russian devaluation and default of August 1998. As can be seen in Table
1, Argentine EMBI4 was 4,4% during the ￿rst half of 1998 but jumped to 7,6% during
the second half. In the same period the Brazilian EMBI was doubled (it jumped from
5,3% to 10,7%).
At the beginning of 1999 Brazil abandoned the "Real Plan" and its currency suf-
fered a great depreciation. The Argentine bilateral real exchange rate with respect
to Brazil su￿ered during 1999 an important appreciation (it decreased 32,1%) 5 and
also the Argentine E￿ective real exchange rate was appreciated (-5,3%). Sovereign
spread remained at high levels after the Russian default as it is shown in Table 1. The
￿nancial restrictions and the idea that a tight ￿scal policy could restore con￿dence
motivated the development of a contractionary ￿scal policy. As can be seen in Table
1, government expenditure decreased 0,6% in 1999 and then signi￿cantly decreased
from 2000 until the second half of 2002 when it started to increase again.
2Uruguay had in operation a crawling band from 1991 to 2002. At the beginning of the program,
the exchange rate of the Uruguayan peso in relation with the US$ was allowed to ￿uctuate within a
band of 7%, the band was devaluated at 2,5% per month.
3The Convertibility was in operation from 1991 to 2001, and consisted in a currency board. The
exchange rate was ￿xed by law in 1 Argentine peso equal 1 US$.
4EMBI ("Emerging market bond index"): corresponds to the sovereign spread (% over US gov-
ernment risk free bonds that have to pay public bonds).

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4The level of credits, given by the banking system to the private sector, decreased
permanently from 2000 onwards contributing to the decrease in the level of activity.
The unrecoverable credits in the banking system increased during the recession, and
were also increasing before the GDP started to decline. This last fact could be a signal
of solvency problems before the recession which were later aggravated and derived in
the banking crisis of 2001.
The ￿nal stage of the crisis was characterized by a triple run (against banking
deposits, public debt and currency). As can be seen in Table 1, deposits in the ￿nancial
system decreased during 2001 and also EMBI experimented a great increase in 2001.
These ￿nancial problems a￿ected the level of reserves that declined 20,1% during 2001.
During 2001 Argentine peso was again appreciated with respect to Brazil.6
Finally, on January 2002 the peso was allowed to ￿oat. In parallel the government
decided a default on the public debt7 and the foreign currency deposits and credits in
the banking sector were compulsory transformed into pesos. 8 The period also included
a general institutional turmoil with several provisional and short-lived governments
taking o￿ce one after another.
3 Literature review
In this section we brie￿y review the literature about the Argentine crisis. We will
focus on the role played by the macroeconomic policies according to the literature.
Mussa (2002) claims that the main problem was the excesively expansionary ￿scal
policy during the second half of the 90’s. The idea that the crisis had ￿scal roots was
shared by policy makers and multilateral ￿nancial institutions. A contractionary ￿scal
policy could have an expanssive e￿ect on GDP, according to this view, via the drop
in insolvency fears, see also on this IMF (2003).
This literature also denied the possibility of escape from the recession via currency
depreciation, basically due to the dollarization of public and private debt. Never-
theless, in IMF (2003) it is also present the idea that an early abandonment of the
Convertibility including a debt restructuring could have been a solution.
Calvo and Talvi (2005) claim that a contractionary ￿scal policy can have an ex-
pansive e￿ect via credibility improvement only if the crisis is localized. That could be
the case if for example the origin of the sudden stop is the lack of con￿dence in the
￿scal prudence of new authorities. In this case if these new authorities follow a tight
￿scal policy, economic con￿dence can be restored which could improve the access of
private sector to capital markets. This kind of policy has more probability of success
if it is complemented with multilateral ￿nancial support or if coincides with a period
of capital in￿ows towards emerging markets. In the case of a systemic crisis (e.g. a
6The EMBI Brazil also increased at that moment. Given the Brazilian ￿oating regime the Brazilian
currency su￿ered a new important depreciation that implied a new real appreciation for the Argentine
peso.
7After a negotiation process defaulted debt was exchanged for new debt on May 2005. The swap
included a very important haircut. After the swap sovereign spread fell dramatically as can be seen
in Figure 1
8Deposits were transformed into peso deposits at an exchange rate of 1,4 pesos per dollar (also their
maturity was extended) and credits were transformed into peso credits at a rate of 1 peso per dollar.
The exchange rate of 1 peso per dollar, in force during the "Convertibility" period, dramatically
changed in the following months reaching almost 4 pesos per dollar in June 2002.
5"systemic sudden stop") a tight ￿scal policy can aggravate the crisis. They stress on
the impact on emerging markets of the sudden stop of capital ￿ows after the Russian
crisis. They state that the ability of an emerging economy to deal with a sudden stop
is related with the degree of openness and with the degree of liability dollarization.
Given that the degree of openness of Argentina was relatively low, the change in the
real exchange rate required to adjust the current account was very large. With a
dollarized economy this is likely to induce important ￿nancial problems. Argentina
economy was vulnerable due to this two problems with independence of the exchange
rate regime. These arguments are also developed on Calvo et al. (2003).
Hausmann and Velasco (2002) emphasize the role played by the decrease in the in-
ternational investors willigness to lend to emerging countries and the drop in expected
exports in 1998. These events led to a high country risk, lower capital in￿ows, less
investment, and a lower GDP which in turns led to a decrease in the ability to borrow.
The underlying theoretical arguments are developed in CØspedes et al. (2004).
Ortiz et al. (2007) analyse the role of ￿scal and monetary policies in several "sys-
temic sudden stop" (SSS) episodes (including Argentina after the Russia crisis). They
show evidence that tighter ￿scal and monetary policies during SSS are associated with
higher drops in output. They conclude that the IMF’s view that ￿scal and monetary
policies has to be tightened to restore credibility is questioned by the empirical evi-
dence.
Powell (2002) uses a monthly VAR from the period 1997-2001 in Argentina. He
includes as variables: EMBI, Deposits, ￿scal revenues, imports and political risk.
He shows that a shock that increases imports (closely related to output) decreases
sovereign spread. Powell (2002) interprets this result as evidence that the main prob-
lem was not a concern about the current account sustainability (in this case an increase
of imports would have increased sovereign spread). This result could also be inter-
preted as evidence that GDP performance is very important for the country risk (and
for the capital ￿ows). We will see more evidence on this on Section 5.1
Our work seeks to provide new evidence about the Argentine crisis. By using VAR
analysis this paper makes a quantitative evaluation about the role played by ￿nancial
shocks and macroeconomic policies during the development of the crisis.
4 Methodological considerations
4.1 Choice of variables
As come out in our analysis in Section 2, the initial shock was the capital ￿ows reversal
(exempli￿ed by the EMBI increase in the second half of 1998) and the Brazilian
devaluation at the beginning of 1999. The ￿nal stage of the crisis is related to a
general deterioration of ￿nancial conditions (e.g. EMBI increase in 2001).
In order to analyse the interactions between sovereign risk, ￿scal policy and ex-
change rate regime during the crisis, we decided to include in our benchmark speci￿-
cation 4 variables: sovereign risk (EMBI Argentina), government expenditure, GDP
and E￿ective real exchange rate. These four variables seems to have played an im-
portant role in the development of the crisis. Sovereign risk is closely connected with
the public debt dynamics and with the origins of the crisis.9 It can also be considered
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Figure 1: Argentina: Benchmark variables
a general measure of ￿nancial distress. Public expenditure is a classical variable to
analyse ￿scal policy. The evolution of the E￿ective real exchange rate is linked with
the exchange rate regime and with the dynamics of the crisis.
In Section 6.2 we comment the results of our analysis using other de￿nitions of the
benchmark variables.
We will use quarterly data from the period 1994:I to 2007:IV. The reduced sample
is given by data restrictions, as it happens with many works about emerging economies.
In particular the information about EMBI elaborated by JP Morgan starts in 1994.
In Figure 1 we show the evolution of the four variables during the analysed period.
As we have already commented, EMBI is expressed in % over US government risk
free bonds. Public expenditure is de￿ned as the sum of wages, purchase of goods and
services and investment ("discretional" expenditure)10, cash basis. Public expenditure
and GDP are expressed in billions of $ 1993. E￿ective real exchange rate is an index
with value 100 in 1994:I. All variables enter in logs in the VAR except EMBI.
The sources of data are described in Appendix A.
4.2 Identi￿cation of shocks
In order to identify the shocks we will use a Cholesky descomposition. In the case of
the sovereign spread shock we assume that changes in the other variables do not have
a contemporaneous e￿ect on the country risk.
country risk.
10As we will discuss in Section 6.2 we also run the VAR with other de￿nitions of public expenditure,
without observing changes in the results
7Information about EMBI is available on a daily basis. An unexpected increase
of EMBI undoubtedly implies problems to ￿nance public spending and to roll-over
existing public debt. This could lead, in the same quarter, to the decision to decrease
or postpone some public expenditures or directly to the impossibility of execute some
public expenses due to a liquidity restriction.
A capital ￿ows reversal, expressed in an EMBI increase, can also a￿ect available
￿nancing for private consumption and investment and conduct to postpone some pri-
vate expenses. That seems to be the case of the capital ￿ows reversal provoked by the
Russian default during the third quarter of 1998. At that moment the EMBI increase
was accompanied by a contemporaneously decrease of consumption and investment in
Argentina.
An unexpected increase of EMBI can a￿ect contemporaneously E￿ective real ex-
change rate. This could certainly be the case during the ￿exible exchange rate period.
During the Convertibility, an EMBI movement can a￿ect the Argentine internal prices
(through the changes in aggregate demand that we commented) or the exchange rate
with trading partners, others than the US. For example, the capital ￿ows reversal of
1998:III, was accompanied with the depreciation of the currencies of some Argentine
trading partners.
A change in other variables can a￿ect sovereign spread by changing the investors
evaluation about ￿scal sustainability, but information about the other variables is
available with lags. Moreover, the interpretation of the e￿ect of a temporary change
in the other variables in ￿scal sustainability could not be straightforward. For example,
a decrease in government expenditure could improve ￿scal sustainability, but if it is
made in the middle of a recession it could aggravate the recession, which could also
a￿ect public sector solvency, a point that we will discuss later. A similar point can be
made about a change in the E￿ective real exchange rate due to changes in the exchange
rate with respect to trading partners, other than US. This type of change is not clear
what kind of e￿ect will have on ￿scal sustainability. A change in the exchange rate with
respect to the US can have an e￿ect in ￿scal sustainability, given the dollarization of
the public debt. However we do not have this kind of shocks during the Convertibility,
and the end of the Convertibility and associated devaluation is identi￿ed by another
approach (dummy variable approach). During the period that debt was on default it
is not clear what e￿ect could have on EMBI an exchange rate movement. After the
swap, debt was less dollarized, and there was no relevant movement of the exchange
rate with respect to the US.
EMBI re￿ects the willingness of foreign investors to hold Argentine public debt.
From this point of view, EMBI is the more external of the considered variables, what
could also justify its inclusion as the most exogenous variable. 11,12
In order to identify the ￿scal shock we assume that changes in the other domestic
variables do not have a contemporaneous e￿ect on government expenditure. Given
that public expenditure is one of the components of aggregate demand, an unexpected
increase of public spending implies a contemporaneous increase of GDP by this way.
This direct e￿ect can be ampli￿ed or diminished by the indirect e￿ects on the other de-
11In Section 6.2 we analyse the results using composite EMBI or Brazilian EMBI, instead of Ar-
gentine EMBI. In this case the interpretation of EMBI as an external ￿nancial shock is more clear.
12We also run the VAR assuming that EMBI can be a￿ected contemporaneously by the other
variables. The results under this speci￿cation are discussed in Section 6.3.
8mand components. Public expenditure relies more on non-tradable goods and services
and so can a￿ect real exchange rate contemporaneously. On the contrary, changes in
the other domestic variables are less likely to have a contemporaneous e￿ect in the
majority of the government expenditure components, which is specially true for the
type of expenditure that we are considering in our benchmark model ("discretionary"
expenditure).
Finally we assume that real exchange rate shocks have no contemporaneous e￿ect
on GDP. A change in the E￿ective real exchange rate due to changes in the exchange
rate with respect to trading partners, others than US, can a￿ect output via changes in
net exports. However, the change in net exports may need some time to materialize.
The majority of the E￿ective real exchange rate shocks during Convertibility are of
these type. An E￿ective real exchange rate shock induced by a change in the exchange
rate with respect to the US, can also have, in a dollarized economy, balance sheet
e￿ects added to the competitiviness ones. Balance sheet e￿ects could a￿ect GDP more
rapidly. However, as we have already discussed, the more important real exchange rate
shock of this type (the end of the Convertibility) is identi￿ed by another approach.
During the ￿exible exchange rate period, the dollarization was drastically reduced. 13
Moreover, after the adjustment associated to the end of peg, there did not seem to
have ocurred relevant shocks to the peso-dollar relationship.
The option of ordering ￿rst EMBI, then GDP and then real exchange rate is also
used in the literature, as for example in Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2009) in a work
that tries to evaluate the convenience of a monetary union in Latin America using VAR
analysis.14 The already commented work of Powell (2002) identify its VAR, used to
analyse the Argentine crisis, assuming that EMBI is the most exogenous variable,
while imports (a close proxy for output) is more endogenous.
The alternative of ordering government expenditure as the most exogenous do-
mestic variable is widely used in the VAR literature on ￿scal policy, as for example
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), M￿ller (2008) and Ravn et al. (2007). Rezk et al.
(2006), analise ￿scal policy in Argentina using a VAR where public expenditure is
assumed to be the most exogenous variable, while GDP is more endogenous (in their
VAR there is no EMBI or real exchange rate).
This identi￿cation scheme can be implemented estimating the reduced form coe￿-
cients, and then computing the Cholesky factorization of the reduced form covariance
matrix with the variables in the order that were presented at the beginning of Section
4.1.
We use a "narrative" or "Dummy variable" approach as a complementary ap-
proach to identify the e￿ects of some important events. In particular we identify by
this way the e￿ects of the Brazilian devaluation. We also use this approach to identify
the e￿ects of the events of the beginning of 2002. As we commented, at that mo-
ment Convertibility was abandoned, default was declared, credits and deposits on the
banking system were pesi￿ed, and there was a general institutional turmoil.
In Appendix E we describe brie￿y the dummy variable approach.
We use four impulse dummies. We include one dummy for the e￿ects on the
Argentine economy of the Mexican crisis of the beginning of 1995 (the "Tequila crisis");
this variable is always zero except in 1995:I. The second dummy that we include is a
13As we commented deposits and credits were compulsory pesi￿ed.
14Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2009) do not use government expenditure in their VAR.
9dummy for the Brazilian devaluation of the beginning of 1999; this dummy is always
zero and takes the value of one in 1999:I. The third dummy is a dummy for the end
of the Convertibility and the default that takes place in Argentina at the beginning
of 2002, the dummy takes the value of one in 2002:I and 2002:II and zero otherwise.
Finally we include a dummy for the debt swap of 2005, the variable is always zero
except on 2005:III when it takes the value of one. We add one lag to each dummy.
The dummies for the "Brazilian devaluation" and for the "end of peg and default"
will be used to identify the dynamic e￿ects of these events, as we commented. The
four dummies will also contribute to improve the performance of the residuals.
4.3 Trend speci￿cation and other issues
We test the stationarity of the variables using unit root tests. The results of these
tests, shown in Appendix B, suggest non stationarity of the four variables. We also
perform Johansen test to check possible cointegrating relations between the variables.
We make the test with a speci￿cation that includes one lag, as it is suggested by AIC
criteria.15
We also include seasonal dummies,16 and the four impulse dummies, with one lag
added to each dummy, that we commented.17 We have a good behavior of residuals
in this case.
As we can see in Table 5, shown in Appendix B we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the cointegrating rank between our four variables is zero.18
We decide to use as benchmark a VAR where non stationarity is modelize as
stochastic (stochastic trend model, "ST"). We take ￿rst di￿erences of the variables.
We include one lag for each endogenous variable, as it is suggested by AIC criteria. 19
The AIC values for di￿erent VAR orders are shown in Appendix C. We also check
the behaviour of our model using other VAR orders, but in these cases the behavior
of residuals was worse, and the forecast performance of the model was diminished.
In particular we check the behavior of the same VAR but with 4 lags, a benchmark
that it is used in some papers. In this particular case, we also have a worse behaviour
of the residuals and our benchmark model seems to be more e￿cient forecasting. In
Appendix D we compare the forecast properties of our benchmark model with the
same model but with 4 lags.20. We include in our baseline speci￿cation the 4 dummies
that we commented previously. We also add 1 lag to each dummy. We also include a
constant and seasonal dummies.
We conduct a battery of formal tests to check the behavior of the residuals and
the subsample stability of our model. According to these tests, the residuals seem to
have a good performance in terms of whiteness and normality and they do not show
15Using other lag orders the behavior of the residuals is worse.
16We obtain the same results with seasonal adjusted data and without seasonal dummies.
17Impulse dummy variables do not a￿ect the asymptotic properties of the test according to L￿tke-
pohl (2005).
18In the results presented in Appendix B we assume a linear trend in the data. We also run the
test assuming a quadratic trend without observing changes in the results.
19A VAR order of one is also used in related literature, as for example in Allegret and Sand-Zantman
(2007) or in the already commented work of Powell (2002).
20We also try using a speci￿cation that only includes the lag 4. In this case the behaviour of the
residuals is worse and the impulse response functions are di￿cult to interpret, so we discard this
option
10evidence of ARCH behavior, as can be seen in Appendix C. No structural breaks are
detected when doing recursive estimation and looking at the recursive Break-point
Chow-test statistics at the 1% signi￿cance level.21 Inverse roots of the AR polynomial
lie inside the unit circle, so our VAR satis￿es the stability condition.
We also run other versions of the model (e.g. changing the de￿nition of the vari-
ables or the dummies), as we will discuss in Section 6.
Recently, there have been many criticism of results that crucially depends on the
method used to induce stationarity.22 In order to address this issue, as in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), we also run versions with deterministic trends ("DT"). In these
cases variables enter in levels and we allow for a linear and a quadratic trend in the 4
variables.23 We use as benchmark the ST speci￿cation because the residuals behavior
and the stability performance was better. Furthermore the results are similar with
both speci￿cations as we will see in Section 6.3.
5 Results
In this Section we present the main results of the paper. In Section 5.1 we analyse the
dynamic e￿ects of an unexpected increase of each of the four endogenous variables. We
also present the dynamic e￿ects of the Brazilian devaluation of beginning of 1999 and
of the end of the Convertibility and default of the beginning of 2002. In Section 5.2 we
present the variance decomposition of the four variables according to our benchmark
speci￿cation. In Section 5.3 we show the estimated shocks during the analysed period.
We try to explain the crisis using these shocks, making special reference to the role
of the macroeconomic policies during the crisis. Finally, in Section 5.4 we make some
considerations about the timing of the end of peg.
5.1 Impulse response functions
In Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4 we discuss the impulse response functions of the four endoge-
nous variables, where the shocks are identi￿ed with the general procedure described
in Section 4.2. The e￿ects of an unexpected increase of one standard deviation of each
of the four variables that we are considering are shown in ￿gures 2 and 3. We show
the responses of the variables for the 8 quarters after the shock. The responses of the
variables can be interpreted as percentage changes. The IRF are shown by solid lines
and shaded area represents one standard error bounds, computed using Monte Carlo
simulations, assuming normality by means of 500 repetitions.
In Sections 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 we discuss the dynamic e￿ects of two important events
related with the Argentine crisis (the Brazilian devaluation and the end of the Con-
vertibility accompanied with the default). In these cases, as we commented, the shocks
are identi￿ed with the dummy variable approach.
21In Section 6.1 we will comment on the stability of some key results if we run our model for the
"Convertibility" period and for the "￿exible exchange rate" period. We will see that the sign of the
GDP responses to the di￿erent shocks seems to be the same in the two periods.
22See for example the controversy between Gali (1999) and Christiano et al. (2003) about the e￿ects
of technology shocks.
23We also run the DT model with an interaction term between the linear trend and the dummy
"end of peg and default", instead of the quadratic trend. The results were similar to the ones reported
in Section 6.3.
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For visual convenience the impulse responses in Figures 2 to 5 have been accumu-
lated to show the evolution of the levels of the variables over time. 24
5.1.1 Sovereign spread shock
A sovereign spread shock can a￿ect aggregate demand through several channels. First,
a shock that increases EMBI implies problems to ￿nance public spending. Furthermore
via increasing the real interest rate in the economy, it can reduce private consumption
and investment.
The left panel of Figure 2 displays the e￿ects of an unexpected increase of one
standard deviation of EMBI. The initial shock implies that sovereign spread increases
3,6%,25 and the ￿nal e￿ect is an increase of 4,4%. This shock has a clear recessive
e￿ect; GDP declines signi￿cantly 1,3% in the ￿rst period, and the ￿nal e￿ect is a
decrease of more than 2%. Government expenditure also decreases 3,2% at the be-
ginning and the ￿nal e￿ect is -4,7%. Finally, E￿ective real exchange rate depreciates
1%.
24Also by this way we facilitate the comparability with the results under DT presented in Section
6.3.
25If for example before the shock US government bonds pay an interest of 3% and Argentine sovere-
ing dollar bonds of the same maturity pay 7%, i.e. sovereign spread is 4%; the one SD unexpected
increase of EMBI implies that sovereign spread becomes 7,6% and so Argentine bonds have to pay
10,6%. As we have commented this kind of shock can be interpreted as re￿ecting a "sudden stop" of
capital in￿ows.
125.1.2 Fiscal shock
Given that public expenditure is one of the components of aggregate demand, an
unexpected increase of public spending directly increases GDP by this way. This
direct e￿ect can be ampli￿ed or diminished by the indirect e￿ects on the other demand
components.26
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the e￿ects of a ￿scal shock, i.e. a public expen-
diture increase of one standard deviation. Government spending increases close to 6%.
This increase in goverment expenditure has an expansive e￿ect over GDP that initially
increases 0,8%. The maximum e￿ect on GDP is reached in the fourth quarter (1,4%).
Real exchange rate appreciates and EMBI decreases after the increase on government
expenditure. The e￿ects on these two variables seems to be lees relevant, specially in
the case of real exchange rate where the e￿ect is statistically insigni￿cant. The drop
in EMBI seems to be related to the expansive e￿ect on GDP of the ￿scal shock. An
increase in GDP decreases sovereign risk as we can see on Figure 3.
Our results are in contrast with the view that a ￿scal adjustment could increase
output in Argentina via a con￿dence shock. This kind of channel would imply that a
government expenditure shock is followed by an EMBI movement in the same direction
(a decrease in government expenditure would be followed by a decrease in EMBI or an
increase in government spending would be followed by an increase in EMBI). However,
we do not ￿nd evidence about this hypothesis. Our results can be interpreted using
the distinction of Calvo and Talvi (2005) between "localized" and "systemic" sudden
stop, that we commented in Section 3. The sudden stop su￿ered by Argentina in
1998 was not only due to a lack of con￿dence in the Argentine situation. As we have
analyzed, the problem was related to the "systemic sudden stop" su￿ered by emerging
countries after the Russian crisis, and so a contractionary ￿scal policy is less likely to
have an expansive e￿ect on GDP via an improved credibility. 27
5.1.3 Real exchange rate shock
An unexpected real exchange rate depreciation can increase output via an improve in
competitiveness that fosters net exports.28 In a dollarized economy it can also have
negative e￿ects on the balance sheets of agents with debts in dollars.
An unexpected depreciation of the E￿ective real exchange rate has an expansive
e￿ect on GDP, according to the IRF of our VAR shown in the right panel of Figure 3.
GDP increases 0,4% in the period after the shock (by identi￿cation the initial e￿ect on
26In the case of private consumption, for example, a keynesian model would predict an increase
of private consumption after an increase in public expenditure, while a neoclassical model usually
predicts the opposite. As we commented, a change in government expenditure could a￿ect default
expectations, and consequently real interest rate, private consumption and investment. In our case we
run the VAR including as a ￿fth changing variable, private consumption, private investment, exports
and imports. We observe that the four components increase after a ￿scal shock.
27A graphical example of the absence of this bene￿cial e￿ect of a contractionary ￿scal policy in
the Argentine case is given by the results of the "zero de￿cit" policy. The same day that Minister
Cavallo announced this policy (15/07/2001), that included a nominal cut on wages and pensions of
13%, EMBI rose from 1200 to 1600 basis points. To see di￿erent explanations about this striking
fact, see Powell (2002) or Hausmann and Velasco (2002).
28It can also have a negative e￿ect on output via the price increase of imported inputs. The e￿ects
on output could also be di￿erent depending on the deviation of the actual real exchange rate from
its equilibrium value.
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GDP is zero), and the ￿nal e￿ect is an increase of 0,7%. The shock itself represents a
depreciation of real exchange rate of 2,4%. The e￿ect of the real exchange rate shock
on GDP does not seem to be very important. However, we are excluding from this
analysis two important real exchange rate shocks, the brazilian devaluation, and the
abandonment of the peg (made in conjunction with the default and other measures).
The e￿ect of these other shocks will be analysed in Sections 5.1.5 and 5.1.6. The minor
GDP e￿ects of this shock can also be the consequence of the simultaneous operation
of di￿erent channels with contradictory e￿ects on output.
This shock increases government expenditure (after an initial negative e￿ect) and
decreases sovereign spread. The e￿ects over government expenditure and EMBI seems
to be related to the expansive e￿ect on GDP of this shock. However these e￿ects on
EMBI and government expenditure are non signi￿cants.
5.1.4 GDP shock
Finally, as we can see on the left panel of Figure 3, a GDP one SD shock (i.e., an
unexpected increase of GDP of 1,6%) has a signi￿cant and persistent expansive e￿ect
on public spending that remains around 3% higher of its initial level during the two
years. Sovereign spread progressively decreases after the shock and it is 1,3% lower
after two years. These e￿ects can be interpreted as evidence of prociclycal ￿scal
policies and capital ￿ows, a typical phenomenon of many emerging economies as it is
documented by Kaminsky et al. (2004). For the Mercosur case BadagiÆn and Cresta
(2005) also ￿nd evidence of procyclical ￿scal policy behaviour. As we have already
commented our results are consistent with the evidence provided by Powell (2002). He
14Figure 4: Responses of benchmark variables to a shock on Brazilian devaluation
dummy
￿nds that a shock that increases imports (a close proxy for activity) decreases EMBI
using Argentine data from the period 1997-2001.
Real exchange rate appreciates at the beginning and then depreciates not signi￿-
cantly after this shock.
5.1.5 Dynamic e￿ects of the Brazilian devaluation
Figure 4 displays the dynamic e￿ects of a unit shock to the Brazilian devaluation
dummy.29 The shock implies an initial appreciation of the real exchange rate of 7,6%,
and the ￿nal e￿ect is a real appreciation of 6%.
This shock has a recessive e￿ect on GDP. The e￿ect on output reaches a peak after
5 quarters, where GDP decreases 4,8%.
Although the signs are reversed with respect to Figure 3, the e￿ects on output
of this real exchange rate shock are very similar. Also as in the case of the real
exchange rate shock of Figure 3 the e￿ects on EMBI and government expenditure are
not signi￿cant.30
The occurrence of this shock was the consequence of the di￿erent response of
Argentina and its main trading parter (Brazil) to the capital ￿ows reversal of mid
1998. The maintenance of the Convertibility in Argentina combined with price rigidity
prevented real exchange rate to adjust. On the contrary Brazil abandoned its Real
Plan and the sharp adjustment of its exchange rate implied a new appreciation shock
29In Figures 4 and 5 the IRF are shown by solid lines and shaded area represents 66% con￿dence
bands computed using bootstrap by means of 500 repetitions. The procedure used to construct the
con￿dence bands is the same used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2007) in the case of
a dummy variable shock.
30In Figure 3 the ￿nal e￿ect of a depreciation of the RER is a decrease in EMBI and an increase
in government expenditure. Here an appreciation of the RER ￿nally increases EMBI (similar e￿ect
considering the sign change) and increases government expenditure (di￿erent e￿ect considering that
the shock has another sign). However, the ￿nal e￿ects in these two variables are clearly not signi￿cant
in Figures 3 and 4.
15Figure 5: Responses of benchmark variables to a shock on "End of peg and default"
dummy
for Argentina that aggravated the recession as we can see in Figure 4.
This shock calls our attention to the necessity of macroeconomic coordination
inside a commercial agreement. The asymmetric response of trading partners to a
symmetric shock can be a source of problems as it is analysed by De Grauwe (2003).
5.1.6 Dynamic e￿ects of the end of peg and default
Figure 5 displays the dynamic e￿ects of a unit shock to the "end of peg and default"
dummy.
This dummy captures the great devaluation associated with the end of the Con-
vertibility. The dummy also catches the e￿ects of the default (that was declared at the
same time as the abandonment of the peg) that implied a great increase in country
risk and the exclusion from ￿nancial markets. At the same moment Argentina su￿ered
the e￿ects of the banking crisis, and the government took several radical measures at
this respect (limitations to the disposal of deposits, together with the pesi￿cation of
credits and deposits). The period also included a general institutional turmoil with
several provisional and short-lived governments taking o￿ce one after another. All
these e￿ects may have played at the same time with di￿erent e￿ects on GDP, so this
shock is not clearly associated with one of the shocks that we studied in Section 5.1.
In terms of our four variables VAR, this shock could be considered as a combination of
a RER depreciation shock, with an EMBI shock and possibly a recessive GDP shock
(related with the institutional instability and the banking crisis).
As we can see in Figure 5 this shock implies an impressive initial depreciation of
the real exchange rate of 47%, that at the end becomes a real depreciation of 30%.
The shock also implies an initial increase of EMBI of 8,3%, EMBI continues increasing
and the increase is 15% after the ￿fth quarter.
These two shocks have an opposite e￿ect on GDP according to our analysis of
Section 5.1. As we have commented, during this period we had also other events
that could have had some negative e￿ects on GDP. As we can see on Figure 5, GDP
16decreases 2,5% in the ￿rst period. This e￿ect is reversed in the following period where
output increases 1%. In the following periods the e￿ect on GDP become negative.
However, the e￿ects from second period onwards are non sign￿cant. 31
Government expenditure initially increases, then decreases, and continues oscil-
lating in the following periods until the 6th quarter when the total e￿ect becomes
negative. With the exception of the e￿ects on the second and on the third quarter,
the other e￿ects are non signi￿cants.
5.2 Variance decomposition
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition of the four variables according to our base-
line speci￿cation.
As can be seen in the table, 35% of the error in forecasting GDP is due to the EMBI
shock. Argentine economy seems to be very sensitive to external ￿nancial shocks. This
result can be also found in the work of Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2009).
Fiscal policy seems to matter for GDP: 14% of the forecast error of GDP is ex-
plained by government expenditure.
Real exchange rate shocks seems less relevant to explain GDP (4% of GDP forecast
error). In this result we have to take into account that we have included dummies for
the main movements in the real exchange rate.
5.3 Estimated shocks: interpreting the crisis
The ￿rst four panels of Figure 6 show the estimated shocks, during the analysed
period, of the four endogenous variables.32 The last two panels show the Brazilian
devaluation dummy and the end of peg and default dummy. The role of these variables
in the Argentine crisis is similar to the estimated shocks, so we show them together.
In the ￿rst four panels the vertical axis is scaled such that one unit is equal to one
standard deviation (SD). A shock of 1 SD in one variable shown in Figure 6 has the
e￿ects on the levels of the 4 endogenous variables that is shown in Figures 2 and 3. For
example an EMBI shock of 1 SD has the e￿ect on the levels of 4 endogenous variables
that is shown in the left pannel of Figure 2. A unit shock in one of the dummies has
the e￿ect in the level of the four endogenous variables shown in Figures 4 and 5.
We can see that in terms of shocks we can characterize the beginning of the process
that conducts to the crisis as an EMBI shock. When the recession started, in the third
quarter of 1998, there is a 0,8 standard deviation EMBI shock. This shock has a clear
recessive e￿ect on GDP, as we analysed in Section 5.1.1. At the same time we have
an appreciation real exchange rate shock of -0,9 SD.33
This original adverse shock was ampli￿ed by an even more important real exchange
rate appreciation shock in the ￿rst quarter of 1999 (the Brazilian devaluation). This
31If we do not include the lag of this dummy, the e￿ects on GDP of this shock have some changes.
The only signi￿cant e￿ect is in the ￿rst period (GDP decline) and on the second period the e￿ect is
positive as here. However, from the third period onwards the e￿ect on GDP is positive. The stability
behaviour of the VAR is better with the lag, so we use this speci￿cation as bechmark.
32In Appendix F we explain how we compute the shocks.
33The EMBI shock, as we already discussed, was a symmetric shock for Latin America economies,
but Argentine exchange rate did not move (given the "Convertibility"), while the exchange rate of
other countries was depreciated, so in terms of Argentina we have an appreciation.
17Table 2: Variance decomposition
Variance decomposition of EMBI
Percentage of the variance of the error made in
forecasting EMBI due to
Forecast EMBI  Gov exp GDP Eff RER
Horizon shock shock shock shock
1 100 0 0 0
4 88 7 5 1
8 88 7 5 1
Variance decomposition of Government expenditure
Percentage of the variance of the error made in
forecasting Government expenditure due to
Forecast EMBI  Gov exp GDP Eff RER
Horizon shock shock shock shock
1 25 75 0 0
4 21 61 16 2
8 21 61 16 2
Variance decomposition of GDP
Percentage of the variance of the error made in
forecasting GDP due to
Forecast EMBI  Gov exp GDP Eff RER
Horizon shock shock shock shock
1 35 13 52 0
4 35 14 48 4
8 35 14 48 4
Variance decomposition of Effective RER
Percentage of the variance of the error made in
forecasting Effective RER due to
Forecast EMBI  Gov exp GDP Eff RER
Horizon shock shock shock shock
1 17 0 2 81
4 15 2 11 72
8 15 2 11 72
































































Figure 6: Estimated shocks, Brazilian devaluation dummy and end of peg and default
dummy. In the ￿rst four panels one unit in the vertical axis indicates one standard
deviation.
shock that we show in the ￿fth panel of Figure 6, had a signi￿cant negative e￿ect on
GDP as we have analysed in Section 5.1.5.
Sovereign spread remained at high levels after the 1998 shock, as we have discussed
in Section 2.34 This situation implied a restriction to ￿nance an expansionary ￿scal
policy. Given this restriction, and trying to convince investors that ￿scal policy was
sustainable, several ￿scal adjustment measures were taken. At the end of 1999 the
Argentine Parliament approved the "Fiscal Responsibility Law". The norm included
limitations to the increase in public expenditure with the intention to reduce the ￿scal
de￿cit to zero in 2003. The application of the law started in 2000, and several tax
increases and expenditure cuts were implemented that implied contractionary ￿scal
shocks. As we can see in Figure 6, these measures implied several contractionary ￿scal
shocks.
The contractionary ￿scal policy was complemented with ￿nancial actions trying
34According to Mussa (2002) IMF sta￿ estimations in 2000 suggested that with a sovereign spread
of 5-6%, the level of real interest rate in Argentina could have been high but compatible with growth,
and also public debt dynamics could have been sustainable. In this hypothesis, could have been
feasible avoid default and mantain the Convertibility regime. However with a spread of 10% or more
it was unlikely that Argentina would have been able to grow. Furthermore with a spread of 10% or
more the primary budget surplus necessary to stabilise public debt was so high that default could
have been unavoidable. As we have seen in Table 1 EMBI was 4,4% during the ￿rst half of 1998,
jumped to 7,6% in the second half and remained at this high level with some oscilations until 2001
where it jumped well above 10%. The spread passed the barrier of 10% on June 2001 and continued
growing very fastly. At the begining of December 2001, before the default was declared the spread
was 40%.
19to restore con￿dence and decrease sovereign risk. For example, at the end of 2000
an important package of 40 billion dollars of ￿nancial support led by the IMF was
announced, (the plan was called "blindaje"). Sovereign spread experimented a short
reduction during some period. In terms of our model we have some small EMBI shocks
(implying an unexpected reduction of sovereign risk) in the second half of 2000.
The bene￿cial e￿ects of these plans on the expectations were modest and the coun-
try risk started to rise again producing new EMBI shocks during 2001. Government
expenditure decreases endogenously after an EMBI shock as we discussed in Section
5.1.1. Nevertheless the ￿scal tightening was even more important and, as we can see
in Figure 6, during 2001 we have additional contractionary ￿scal shocks. The ￿scal
contraction was specially intense after the announcement in mid 2001 of the "zero
de￿cit" policy. This policy implied a 13% cut in public wages and pensions bene￿ts,
and reductions in public investment. In Figure 6 we can see a ￿scal shocks of -1,2 SD
on 2001:III.
In July 2001, the run against the banks that started in 2000 was intensi￿ed and
Central Bank reserves declined. As a consequence the available credit were diminished.
Consumption and investment, that were decreasing during all the recession, dropped
even more sharply. In our estimated model we see a GDP shock of -1,8 SD in the
third quarter of 2001. This shock implied a GDP contraction added to the endogenous
contraction originated in the EMBI and ￿scal shocks.
Brazilian currency su￿ered during 2001 a new important depreciation that implied
a new real appreciation for the Argentine peso. In the third quarter of 2001 we have
a real exchange rate appreciation shock of 1,9 SD.35
Finally in the fourth quarter of 2001, we have an important EMBI shock of 2,9 SD
(EMBI attained an impressive 30% on average in 2001:IV).
These shocks implied a strong GDP decrease that was already decreasing for more
than 3 years. At the beginning of 2002, in the middle of a social turmoil, the peso
was allowed to ￿oat. In parallel the government decided a default on the public debt
and the foreign currency deposits and credits in the banking sector were compulsory
transformed into pesos. The end of the Convertibility implied a depreciation shock,
and default resulted in an additional EMBI shock. As we commented we included a
dummy for these events, that it is shown in the last panel of Figure 6. The e￿ects of
these events were discussed in Section 5.1.6.
5.4 Some considerations about the timing of the end of peg
The abandonment of Convertibility was accompanied with a default in public debt, a
banking crisis and institutional problems. However, one question remains open: what
would have happened if Argentina would have abandoned the Convertibility at the
beginning of the recession?
The answer is not obvious, but the previous analysis seems to suggest that an early
abandonment of the Convertibility could have had some advantages.
Argentine high degree of ￿nancial dollarization implied an important vulnerability
in face of a real exchange rate adjustment no matter the exchange rate regime.
35According to the work of Perry and Serven (2003), the real exchange rate of Argentina was
appreciated with respect to its equilibrium value during the recession. In 2001 the real exchange rate
become strongly misaligned, its deviation from equilibrium was estimated in 53%.
20However, the lack of adjustment of the exchange rate, due to the Convertibility,
implied that the adjustment had to be made through de￿ation and recession (given
price rigidity). This type of adjustment aggravated the negative activity consequences
of the balance sheet e￿ects of the real exchange rate adjustment.
The ￿nancial position of many agents in the economy were aggravated by the long
lasting recession and were added to the balance sheet e￿ects of the ￿nal real exchange
rate adjustment. The banking problems could have been less dramatic with an earlier
adjustment.
The Argentine public debt, and its average interest rate, was not so high at the
beginning. An earlier adjustment could have been better managed, and default could
have been avoided or at least debt could have been restructured in a more friendly
manner. However, during the recession, Argentine public debt over GDP increased in
an important way, and also the interest rate paid by the debt increased. 36
Furthermore the adjustment was very slow and in the meanwhile Argentina su￿ered
new real exchange rate appreciation shocks, as we analysed in Section 5.1.5. Finally
after more than 3 years of recession the needed adjustment of the real exchange rate
was probably higher and was made by a great exchange rate increase.
Our results seems to suggest that an early and ordered abandonment of the Con-
vertibility could have been more bene￿cial than the chosen option. We derive this
conclusion mostly from the fact that ￿nally it was not possible to continue with the
Convertibility and the regime change was made in the middle of a general turmoil.
However, a complete elucidation of the issue seems di￿cult with the empirical tools
used in this paper. The issue could be better analysed in a theoretical model where
the behavior of the system under di￿erent exchange rate regimes can be considered. 37
6 Robustness
In this section we analyse how the impulse response functions of Figures 2 and 3 behave
in the two main subsamples. We also discuss how these impulse response functions
change if we modify some of the assumptions of the benchmark speci￿cation.
6.1 Subsample stability
We run the model for the "Convertibility" period (1994-2001) and for the "Flexible
exchange rate" period (2002-2007). On Table 3 we show the maximum GDP response
to the di￿erent shocks in the two subsamples. According to our results the signs of
the GDP response to the shocks seems to be the same in the two periods.
The e￿ect of the EMBI shock on GDP seems to be more important during the
Convertibility. One possible explanation of this behavior could be related to the fact
that Argentina was excluded from international ￿nancial markets during the Flexible
36Argentine public debt over GDP was 37% in 1998. According to Calvo et al. (2003) if Argentine
real exchange rate would have been adjusted 50% in 1998, the ratio would have jumped to 50%, a
lower ratio than the Brazilian one, that realized a successful adjustment. However, in 2002 after the
long lasting recession and ￿nal real exchange rate adjustment, the public debt over GDP reached
136%.
37For example, the already commented theoretical analysis of CØspedes et al. (2004) suggests that a
￿exible exchange rate regime could help to confront with adverse external shocks even in the presence
of ￿nancial dollarization and balance sheet e￿ects.
21Table 3: Stability of GDP responses
Maximum GDP response due to:
Period EMBI  Gov exp Eff RER
shock shock shock
1994-2001 -3,44 (7) 0,55 (2) 0,46 (8)
2002-2007 -0,70 (3) 0,53 (2) 0,45 (4)
exchange rate regime, given the default. Another explanation could be that the real
exchange rate adjust less during Convertibility so the e￿ect of the EMBI shock on
GDP is ampli￿ed.
6.2 Other de￿nitions of variables
We run the model using di￿erent de￿nitions of the real exchange rate. One obvious
candidate to this exercise is the real exchange rate with respect to Brazil that, as
we saw, played a relevant role in the crisis. Using this speci￿cation the responses
of the variables are basically the same that we reported here, with the exception of
the response of real exchange rate to the EMBI shock. An unexpected increase of
the sovereign spread that depreciates real e￿ective exchange rate in our benchmark
model, now initially depreciates but then appreciates the real exchange rate with
respect to Brazil (the movements are not signi￿cant). This fact seems to be related to
the di￿erent answer of Argentine and Brazilian monetary policy in face of the EMBI
shocks (that were basically a common shock as we saw in Table 1). While Brazil opted
for devaluate, Argentina maintained its peg, so the increase in EMBI (the "sudden
stop" of capital in￿ows) is followed by an appreciation of the Argentine real exchange
rate with respect to Brazil.
Another possible candidate is the real exchange rate with respect to the US, given
that the Argentine economy was heavily dollarized (in particular public debt was in
dollars) and also the peg was with respect to the dollar. The impulse responses under
this speci￿cation are basically the same that we reported for the benchmark case.
One interesting di￿erence is that the appreciation of the real exchange rate in face of
a ￿scal shock is clearer in this case. This fact can provide an incentive to ￿nance an
unsustainable ￿scal policy by issuing public debt in dollars. Another di￿erence is that
we are not able to see the real exchange rate appreciation shocks during the recession
with this speci￿cation.
We also run the VAR with EMBI Brazil or with the composite EMBI instead of
EMBI Argentina. These variables can re￿ect the credit conditions of the region (EMBI
Brazil) or of the emerging markets (composite EMBI) and they are less likely to be
a￿ected by Argentine domestic factors not considered in the VAR, so it is more easy
to interpret them as an external ￿nancial shock. We do not observe relevant changes
in the results. In these two cases the responses of EMBI to the domestic variables
shocks are less important, as expected.
In our baseline speci￿cation public spending is de￿ned as the sum of wages, pur-
chases of goods and services and public investment. We consider another de￿nition
including all the public spending. We run the VAR with this de￿nition without ob-
serving relevant changes.
22All variables, except EMBI, are de￿ated using GDP de￿ator. We consider two
alternative options, we use the CPI as de￿ator of the government spending, and we
consider another speci￿cation with the variables in real per capita terms. The results
are similar to the benchmark case.
6.3 Alternative orderings and other speci￿cations
As we discuss in Section 4 in our benchmark VAR we identify the EMBI shock assum-
ing that EMBI is the most exogenous variable. We run the VAR assuming that EMBI
is the most endogenous variable. Using this alternative the impulse response functions
are similar to the benchmark case. The main di￿erence between this alternative spec-
i￿cation and the benchmark one is the relevance of the GDP response to the EMBI
and ￿scal shock. An unexpected EMBI increase conducts to a GDP decrease as in
the baseline ordering, but now this e￿ect is not signi￿cant. The e￿ect of an EMBI in-
crease on government expenditure is now negligible, while in the baseline speci￿cation
we have a signi￿cant government expenditure decrease that reinforces the recessive
e￿ect of the EMBI shock. An unexpected rise in government expenditure leads to a
GDP increase and to an EMBI decrease as in our benchmark results. However, the
GDP and EMBI movements due to the ￿scal shock are now more important. With this
alternative speci￿cation the absence of a bene￿cial e￿ect on GDP of a ￿scal restriction
via a credibility improvement is even clearer. The estimated shocks are similar, but
now the EMBI shocks are smaller and the ￿scal shocks are larger. The role of EMBI
shocks as explanation of the crisis is now less relevant. In contrast, the role of the
contractionary ￿scal policy in the crisis is more important. Using this speci￿cation
the decrease of government expenditure during the recession has no relation with the
increase in sovereign risk, which seems implausible.
In our benchmark model real exchange rate can not a￿ect contemporaneously
GDP. We also run the model using a speci￿cation where GDP is a￿ected in the same
quarter by real exchange rate shocks. In this case the signs of the ￿nal responses of the
variables to the four shocks shown in Figures 2 and 3 are the same. Nevertheless, there
is a di￿erence in the GDP response to a real exchange rate shock. Now, as in Figure 3
an unexpected real exchange rate depreciation leads to a GDP increase. However, in
the ￿rst quarter GDP has a small decrease that it is reverted from the second quarter
onwards. The ￿nal positive e￿ect on GDP is not signi￿cant. As we discussed in Section
5.1.3 the minor GDP e￿ects of this shock can be the consequence of the simultaneous
operation of di￿erent channels with contradictory e￿ects on output. Estimated shocks
are almost identical to the shocks shown in Figure 6. The interpretation of the crisis
is basically the same that we described in Section 5.3. The only exception is that the
real exchange rate shocks identi￿ed with the general procedure are now less relevant as
explanation of the crisis. However the interpretation of the role played by the two main
real exchange rate shocks (the Brazilian devaluation and the end of the Convertibility)
remains the same, given that they were identi￿ed by the dummy variable approach.
We also run the model without the dummies and the responses of the variables
to the shocks are similar (in this case we have a more important e￿ect of the real
exchange rate shock).
In Annex G, Figure 7 we add the impulse responses under deterministic trends (DT
23speci￿cation),38 to the corresponding to the benchmark ST speci￿cation including the
con￿dence bands. The responses of the variables to each shock are very similar to
the corresponding to the baseline ST speci￿cation. In the majority of the cases the
responses under DT enter into the ST con￿dence bands.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study the role of ￿nancial shocks and macroeconomic policies during
the Argentine crisis using VAR analysis.
Our analysis suggests that the crisis can be interpreted as the result of an ad-
verse ￿nancial external shock, a "sudden stop" of capital in￿ows, ampli￿ed by local
vulnerabilities. The signi￿cant negative e￿ects of the EMBI shocks can re￿ect ￿-
nancial weakness. In Mourelle (2009) we provide evidence about the lack of strong
￿scal sustainability in Argentina and Uruguay, aggravated in the Argentine case with
reputational problems.
In this context, ￿scal policy su￿ered ￿nancial restrictions. Furthermore, policy
makers and multilateral ￿nancial institutions thought that a contractionary ￿scal pol-
icy could have an expanssive e￿ect on GDP, via the drop in insolvency fears. As a
result, ￿scal policy was used in a contractionary way.
However, we ￿nd no evidence about an expansive e￿ect on GDP of a contractionary
￿scal policy in the Argentine case. Fiscal policy seems to behave in a more conventional
way, and an unexpected movement of government expenditure seems to be followed
by a GDP movement in the same direction. The contractionary ￿scal policy implied
that the GDP decrease was exacerbated by negative ￿scal shocks.
Argentine experience suggests the convenience of avoid a contractionary ￿scal pol-
icy during a recession. Two ingredients can help to this task: a strongly sustentable
￿scal policy based on a tight ￿scal behaviour during booms and better international
liquidity provision mechanisms.
A devaluation can have negative consequences on a dollarized economy, via nega-
tive balance sheets e￿ects on agents that have debts in foreign currency but assets in
domestic currency (notably the public sector). However, allowing the exchange rate
to move can help the adjustment process for an economy like Argentina after a shock.
Preventing real exchange rate to adjust can have important output costs. The lack of
adjustment of the real exchange rate favored the long lasting recession. The ￿nancial
situation of the private and public sector was deteriorated as a consequence of the
enduring recession.
The Convertibility prevented real exchange rate to adjust, and favored new appre-
ciation shocks that aggravated the recession as we saw in Section 5.1.5.
Together with the exchange rate regime these shocks were the consequence of the
lack of macroeconomic coordination inside the Mercosur. The asymmetric response of
trading partners to a symmetric shock can be a source of problems as it is analysed by
De Grauwe (2003). This was the case of the di￿erent response of Brazil and Argentina
to the capital ￿ows reversal.
These considerations suggest that a successful policy to prevent sudden stop crisis
38As we have commented, in the case of the benchmark ST speci￿cation the impulse responses have
been accumulated so they are comparable with the responses under DT.
24should include a de-dollarization process, exchange rate ￿exibility and macroeconomic
coordination with the main trading partners.
For an emerging country with a pervasive ￿nancial dollarization it remains open the
issue of the more convenient exchange rate regime to confront with adverse external
shocks. Is it better a ￿xed exchange rate in order to avoid high movements of the
real exchange rate and the associated balance sheet e￿ects, or is it better a ￿exible
exchange rate to minimize the output e￿ects? In terms of the Argentine crisis, would
have been better the results if Argentine would have abandoned the Convertibility at
the beginning?
Our results seems to suggest that an early and ordered abandonment of the Con-
vertibility could have been more bene￿cial than the chosen option. We derive this
conclusion mostly from the fact that ￿nally it was not possible to continue with the
Convertibility and the regime change was made in the middle of a general turmoil.
However, a complete elucidation of the issue seems di￿cult with the empirical tools
used in this paper. The issue could be better analysed in a theoretical model where
the behavior of the system under di￿erent exchange rate regimes can be considered.
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27A Data Appendix
EMBI and E￿ective real exchange rate are from JP Morgan. Public expenditure is
from MECON. GDP, GDP de￿ator and CPI are from INDEC. Exchange rate is from
the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA). Public debt over GDP is from IADB.
Deposits, credits and unrecoverable credits are from the Central Bank of Argentina.
These series were de￿ated with GDP de￿ator.
Foreign exchange reserves in the Central Bank are from IMF. Original data was
in dollars, it was converted to pesos using exchange rate (BCRA) and de￿ated with
GDP de￿ator.
Private consumption, exports and imports are from national accounts (INDEC).
Quarterly private investment were estimated from annual private investment (INDEC)
using Chow-Lin method with quarterly total investment from national accounts as high
frequency indicator.
USA’s CPI is from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Brazilian exchange rate is from IMF, CPI is from Central Bank of Brazil.
28B Unit root and Johansen tests
As we can see in Table 4, according to ADF test we can not reject the unit root
hypothesis for the benchmark variables.39
Table 4: ADF test
Variable Statistic 5% critical value
EMBI -1,33 -2,92
Gov. expenditure -2,72 -3,51
GDP -1,13 -3,50
RER -1,00 -2,92
Note: All variables in logs except EMBI. Model with intercept 
and trend for Gov. expenditure and GDP, and with intercept
for EMBI and RER. Lags according to AIC.
Table 5 shows the result of a Johansen test between the four benchmark variables.
According to the test we cannot reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating rank
between the four variables is zero.40
Table 5: Johansen test
Ho: number
of CE's Statistic 5% critical value Statistic 5% critical value
None 39,2 47,21 23,81 27,07
Trace test Max eigen test
39We also run ADF tests for the ￿rst di￿erences of the variables in order to discard the I(2)
hypothesis. We also perform Phillips Perron tests. In all the cases the tests seem to favoured the I(1)
hypothesis for these variables.
40As we commented in Section 4.3 in the results presented in Table 5 we assume a linear trend in
the data. We also run the test assuming a quadratic trend without observing changes in the results.
29C VAR order and residual tests
In Table 6 we can see that the lag order suggested by the Akaike criteria is one.







Table 7 shows the residuals behavior of the benchmark speci￿cation according to
some standard tests.
LM and Portmanteau are multivariate tests for residual serial correlation up to
the speci￿ed order (h). LM tests are more appropriate for small values of h, and
Portmanteau tests are more suitable for a large h (h has to be, at least, higher than
the lag order).
Hetero is an extension for systems of equations of the White (1980) test for Het-
eroskedasticity. Normality is the multivariate Jarque-Bera test. ARCH is a multivari-
ate ARCH-LM test.
As can be seen in Table 7 our model seems to have a good behavior in terms of
whiteness and normality and they do not show evidence of ARCH behavior. At 1%
signi￿cance level our model satisfy the tests reported in Table 7. 41
Table 7: Residual tests
Test Normality Hetero
h=1 h=4 Q(h=8) Q*(h=8) h=1 h=4
Statistic 17,88 15,09 120,64 131,95 102,40 393,68 16,28 156,52
p-value 0,33 0,52 0,27 0,10 0,41 0,58 0,04 0,96
LM Portmanteau ARCH
41As in the other cases, we cannot reject normality at the 1% signi￿cance level. The p-value is close
to 5%. However, we can reject normality if we apply a more tough criteria. The residuals distribution
is ￿at relative to the normal, a problem related with the important quantity of dummies that we have
used. If we use a lower number of dummies, we have a better behavior in terms of normality. For
example, if we run the model using only the dummy for the end of peg and the dummy for the swap
the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test is 0,39. In this case we have similar results to the ones reported in
Section 5. However, the behaviour of the model in terms of subsample stability is worse so we opted
for the inclusion of the dummies presented in Section 4.3.
30D Pseudo out of sample forecasts
We compute simulated out of sample forecasts over the period from 2006:I to 2007:IV.
We examine forecast horizons of one quarter, two quarters and three quarters. As in
Stock and Watson (2001) we estimate the forecast h steps ahead by running the VAR
through a given quarter, making the forecast h steps ahead, running again the VAR
through the next quarter, making again the forecast h steps ahead, and we continue
like this until the end of the forecast period. We then compute the square root of the
average squared value of the forecast error over the forecast period. The result of this
excercise is shown in Table 8. We show the results for our baseline speci￿cation, VAR
with one lag, as it is suggested by AIC criteria, and for the same VAR but with 4
lags, a benchmark that it is used in some papers. In both speci￿cations we include a
constant, seasonal dummies and the dummies that we commented in Section 4.
As we can see in Table 8 our benchmark speci￿cation is more e￿cient forecasting
than the speci￿cation with 4 lags. We use this evidence as a complementary criteria
to choose the more parsimonius model as we commented in Section 4. We also com-
pute the same excercise using other number of lags, (not showed in the Table). Our
benchmark speci￿cation seems to haver better forecast performance than these other
options.
Table 8: Root Mean Squared Errors of Simulated out of sample forecasts. Argentina:
2006:I-2007:IV
Forecast VAR(1) VAR(4) VAR(1) VAR(4) VAR(1) VAR(4) VAR(1) VAR(4)
Horizon
1 0,01 0,14 0,09 0,15 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,08
2 0,02 0,15 0,13 0,22 0,03 0,08 0,03 0,12
3 0,03 0,19 0,11 0,33 0,04 0,14 0,03 0,15
EMBI Gov. Exp. GDP Eff RER
31E The dummy variable approach
The dummy variable approach was developed by Romer and Romer (1989) to study
monetary policy.42 The approach has been used to identify other type of shocks. In
particular this approach has been widely used to identify ￿scal shocks after the work
of Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Following Perotti (2007), in the case of a ￿scal shock,
the approach consists in identifying episodes of unexpected government expenditure
expansion. For example Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify 3 episodes of unexpected
increase of defense spending: Korean War, Vietnam War and the expansion of defense
spending under Reagan. Perotti (2007) adds the expansion under Bush administration
after 2001. We de￿ne D1t, D2t, D3t and D4t, that takes the value of 1 at the beginning
of the episody of ￿scal expansion and 0 otherwise. In the "￿rst version" of the dummy
variable approach ("DV1"), we de￿ned the combined dummy variable as Dt = D1t +
D2t + D3t + D4t. Then we estimate the reduced form VAR:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + B(L)Dt + Ut (1)
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables including in this case government spend-
ing, taxes and output, A(L) is a polynomial of order nA, B(L) is a polynomial of order
nB+1 and Ut is the vector of residuals. Then, the e￿ect of this shock on the endoge-
nous variables at t + k is given by the estimated coe￿cient on Lk in the expansion of
(I − A(L)L)−1B(L).
Perotti (2007) proposes three other versions of the approach. In our case, it will
be of interest the "DV3" version that implies that the responses to each episode can
be di￿erent. This can be the case if for example each episode has di￿erent intensity
or if each episode is a di￿erent combination of changes in expenditure and taxes.
For example the expenditure expansion of Korean War was accompanied of increased
taxes, while the spending expansion of Vietnam War came with tax cuts. In this case
we estimate:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 +
4 X
i=1
Bi(L)Dit + Ut (2)
where each Bi(L) is a vector polynomial of order nB + 1.
In our case Xt consists of four variables: EMBI, government expenditure, GDP and
real exchange rate. We have 4 dummies, and each one consists of episodes of di￿erent
intensity and that implies di￿erent combination of changes in the variables. We will
concentrate in the e￿ect of two of these dummies: the Brazilian devaluation dummy
and the "end of peg and default" dummy. In the case of the Brazilian devaluation, the
episode is a real exchange rate shock that implies an appreciation for Argentina. In the
case of the "end of peg and default", the episode will be basically the combination of a
real exchange rate shock that depreciates the Argentine currency (associated with the
abandonment of Convertibility), and an EMBI shock (associated with the default). 43
42See the discussion about the dummy variable approach in Tiscordio and Bucacos (2009).
43The "end of peg and default" shock probably include an exogenous component of negative GDP
shock, due to the collapse of the banking system and the institutional turmoil.
32F Shocks
In this appendix we explain how to obtain the shocks that we show in the ￿rst four
panels of Figure 6.44
As we commented in Section 4.2 we ￿rst estimate a reduced form VAR like the
one presented in equation 2, where Ut is the vector of reduced form residuals at date
t (Ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Ω)).
For a given sample T, we can estimate by OLS the reduced form covariance matrix,
ˆ Ω, as follows:
ˆ Ω = (1/T)
T X
t=1
ˆ Ut ˆ Ut
0
(3)
where the ith element of ˆ Ut is the OLS sample residual for the ith equation in the
VAR for date t. In our case ˆ Ut is a (4x1) vector (given that we have 4 endogenous
variables) and we have one ˆ Ut for each t (t=1,2,....,T), ˆ Ω is a (4x4) matrix.
The identi￿cation procedure that we saw in Section 4.2 implies the computation
of the Cholesky factorization of the reduced form covariance matrix with the variables
in the order that were presented at the beginning of Section 4.1.
The Cholesky factorization can be written:
ˆ P ˆ P
0
= ˆ Ω (4)
where ˆ P is a (4x4) lower triangular matrix. Using this matrix we can construct a
(4x1) vector ˆ vt from
ˆ P
0 ˆ Ut = ˆ vt (5)
We have one ˆ vt for each t (t=1,2,....,T). These shocks were the ones that we rep-
resent in the ￿rst four panels of Figure 6. These disturbances are consistent with
the identi￿cation procedure used to derive the Impulse response functions shown in
Figures 2 and 3.
44A similar discussion to the one presented here, can be found in Chapter 14.4 of Hamilton (1994).
33G Robustness
In this appendix we show how the impulse response functions of the benchmark speci￿cation
(see Figures 2 and 3) change when we consider a deterministic trend (DT) instead of the
stochastic trend (ST).
Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions under benchmark ST speci￿cation and under DT. Shaded
area indicates 1 SE con￿dence bands of ST speci￿cation. −: ST; +: DT.
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